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It is widely assumed that as populations become more market integrated the ‘inner circles’ of
people’s social networks become less densely connected and family-oriented. This ‘loosening’
of kin networks may fundamentally alter the social dynamics of reproduction, facilitating
demographic transitions to low fertility. Few data exist to test this hypothesis. Previous
research in urbanized populations has not explicitly measured kin density in ego-networks,
nor assessed how market integration inﬂuences network structure at different levels of
aggregation. Here I analyze the ego-networks of ~2000 women in 22 rural Polish commu-
nities transitioning from subsistence farming to market-dependence. I compare how ego-
network size, density and kin density co-vary with household and community-level market
integration. Market integration is associated with less kin-dense networks, but not neces-
sarily less dense ones, and is unrelated to network size. Declining kin density during eco-
nomic transitions may be a critical mechanism for the broader cultural transmission of low
fertility values.
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The question of how ‘community’ is transformed as popu-lations go through major economic and social changes isfoundational to many social sciences1,2. For most of
human history, kinship has been the fundamental structuring
principle for economic, socio-political and ritual relations, but it
is widely assumed that ‘traditional’ social interactions break down
as populations become more market integrated3–6. Speciﬁcally,
personal networks are assumed to become less kin-oriented and
densely connected. This ‘loosening’ of kin relations, as part of a
suite of profound social and structural changes during the course
of market integration, is thought to be a critical mechanism
driving the global demographic transition to low fertility.
Sociologists have long examined whether kinship, friendship
and neighbourhood ties are ‘lost’, ‘saved’ or ‘liberated’ in the
urbanisation process7, and whether declining kin interactions are
a cause or a consequence of industrial intensiﬁcation8–10. This
research is dominated by evidence from urban populations in
Western Europe and North America6,11–15. A parallel literature
in anthropology has focused on how social networks in ‘small-
scale’ and mixed subsistence economies compare to those in
market-dependent ones16–19. This work has focused more on
how networks maintain cultural complexity20–22, reproduce
social and political equilibria23, buffer food and other
shortages18,24, signal reputation25 and social capital26 but less on
what happens to those networks in times of transition.
All economic transitions are associated with profound demo-
graphic and socio-cultural changes that affect both the availability
of kin as network partners and the costs and beneﬁts of different
social structures. It is important to situate network studies within
the demographic context of the communities undergoing change,
because these features co-evolve. For example, high mobility
among some hunter-gatherer groups can generate relatively
low relatedness and apparently less kin-oriented networks17,27
than among sedentary farmers. Transitions to agriculture
can generate increasingly kin-saturated social worlds because of
extended family co-residence, greater reliance on food storage,
higher fertility27 and mortality, leading to larger, denser, more
interrelated populations17,28–31. Transitions away from sub-
sistence farming to a market economy are similarly associated
with major demographic changes: relatively fewer complex family
living arrangements, higher mobility—both geographic and social
—associated with wage-labour and education, lower mortality
due to improvements in sanitation and infrastructure, and
declining fertility due to decreased reliance on primary agri-
cultural productivity and a parallel increase in human capital
investment3,32–35.
Declining density of social networks in the course of these
transitions has signiﬁcant implications for how resources and
social support ﬂow between individuals, for the content of
interpersonal exchanges and how this inﬂuences cultural change,
and ultimately for the demography of a population. Dense net-
works can generate social interdependence and rapid consensus-
formation but also social control and resistance to change36,37 via
similar mechanisms, such as conformity and social inﬂuence.
Tight-knit relationships can help people monitor and maintain
social norms, but intimate groups also have their own modes of
discourse, reference, and interpretation of the world and so a
dense network can be insular and socially cut-off. Low-density
networks instead evoke the idea of transient, untethered, trans-
actional or impersonal social contacts. Sparser networks with
diverse, ‘weak’38 and cross-cutting connections can potentially
spread novel information easily and quickly within a community.
This can facilitate rapid adaptation to social and environmental
challenges, help people reject existing social hierarchies, and
accumulate cultural innovations across communities through
partial connectivity21.
Whether these inner circles are composed of kin or non-kin is
important because kin can be powerful brokers of behaviour
change, blocking or backing new ideas, often while having vested
interests in the domain of reproduction. Evolutionary anthro-
pologists tend to assume that humans evolved as ‘cooperative
breeders’39, relying on kin for support of reproduction40.
Assuming that kin have broadly pro-natal or ﬁtness-consistent
inﬂuences on reproduction41, increasing non-kin interactions
could disrupt these evolved patterns of coordination42. Scaling
up, by increasing population-level rates of horizontal (peer-to-
peer) relative to vertical (parent-to-child) transmission43, or
through weak ties38, non-kin interactions may allow the spread of
new values associated with low fertility in a population42. For this
reason, women’s personal networks have come into focus for
research on fertility decline36,44. Studies of contraceptive
uptake45–50, drawing on the diffusion of innovations literature51,
have examined how network density either critically slows-down
or accelerates the uptake of novel contraceptives and fertility
decline48,49. Kin have been shown to have important inﬂuences
on contraceptive use46,47,52–54, and my colleagues and I46 have
previously argued that personal discussion networks may be an
important locus of innovation and experimentation in which
community-level norms can be safely violated. Prestige dynamics,
conformity and other psychological biases can then help spread
innovative behaviour through wider networks and populations.
In urbanised market economies, core network partners change
over time and as people go through major life transitions such as
marriage and divorce55–58, but kin are still prominent in social
networks. Women’s networks typically contain more kin than do
men’s6,37,59–61 and married women’s networks are the most kin
saturated59. This could be driven by unequal access to economic
and social opportunities for women compared to men59, gendered
domestic and parenting roles that concentrate kin in married
women’s networks, and time constraints on women’s network-
formation during reproductive-aged years. In urban USA, China
and southern France14,60,61, personal discussion networks have
recently shrunk, become more diverse and less dense. In the US
and French cases, kin connections were better maintained over
time, while in China more kin connections were lost61. Among
young adults transitioning from school to university in the UK,
kin connections were more stable than non-kin connections, i.e.
less sensitive to decay, replacement and abandonment over time62.
In Canada between the 1970s and 2000s, face-to-face interaction
with kin and close friends changed little, and telephone contact
increased, with kin being contacted more than non-kin63.
Because economic modernisation provides the means to stay in
contact (i.e. communication systems) and interact (e.g. transport
facilities)10,63,64, geographic mobility does not have to lead to
fragmented kin networks64 and indeed, kin relations appear to rely
less on geographic proximity than do non-kin relations65. The
evidence therefore suggests that in market economies where non-
kin are frequently interacted with, kin remain highly represented
in personal networks5,8,14,37,60,66,67, especially among highly
educated people60. Even where the relationship is not considered
intimate, kin are seen as reliable and likely to respond to their
perceived obligations as family13.
To the best of my knowledge, there have been no tests of the
hypothesis that kin density declines as small-holder farmers
transition to a fully market-dependent economy61. Here I address
this gap by analysing the ego-networks of 1995 women in 22
communities in an area of rural Poland characterised by centuries
of peasant subsistence farming but which has been abandoning
these practices since Poland’s accession to the European Union in
200468. This mid-transitional context allows: (1) a sampling of
populations on a spectrum of market integration; (2) a measure of
market integration that can be explicitly compared across
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communities and levels of analysis; (3) control for cultural, reli-
gious and linguistic differences that might independently struc-
ture personal networks; and ﬁnally (4) a new, explicit measure of
kin density. In previous work in this region I and my colleagues
have examined how the transition to market dependence may be
altering women’s reproductive strategies32,68 via personal net-
works that channel contraceptive use46 and low fertility values69
and through contextual effects at the community level46,69. Here I
show that a key mechanism—declining kin density of personal
networks—is also evident during this transition.
Results
Measuring market integration. At the time of the survey
(2009–2010), more than 65% of participants lived in households
subsisting on farming, with additional incomes combining formal
and informal wage labour, seasonal and migrant employment68,70.
Working patterns28 are shifting steadily towards the labour mar-
ket as the population turns away from traditional inheritance and
post-marital migration strategies68 and as fertility declines. To
capture market integration I created a weighted composite index
of household members’ occupation, occupational prestige and
employment history (up to 15 people, see32,69). The diversity of
income sources allows the incorporation of both ‘traditional’ and
‘modern’ dimensions of wealth creation32. Market integration is
standardised and then group-mean centred within communities:
an individual’s score is her household’s deviation from the
community mean.
Demographic and network features of the study communities.
The study communities are saturated with kin (Fig. 1). This is due
to the combined effects of: (a) high completed fertility (mean 3.8,
s.d. 2.15. Note the Polish total fertility rate when the data were
collected was 1.2) and low levels of lifetime childlessness (~5% of
all 907 post-reproductive women remained childless); (b) high
levels of endogamous marriage (28% of marriages were con-
tracted within the community, ranging from ~5 to 54% across
villages); (c) relatively late age at out-migration for women who
moved (mean 24.5 years, s.d. 9.2); (d) short distances between
natal and post-marital residences, for both men and women
(modal distance is 2–3 km); and (e) strong between-community
marriage connections (75% of all marriages, n= 1205, were
contracted within the 22 study communities).
During semi-structured interviews, all women (aged 18–91,
mean 44 years, s.d. 17.8) were prompted with the following
name-generator: ‘Please name up to ﬁve women you could call
your friends. These are women you are close to and who you can
talk to about important personal matters (for example about
children, family, health or other things). These women can be
your relatives or come from outside your family. They can be
from this village or anywhere else. You don’t have to name ﬁve.’
(see Methods, Supplementary Note 1 and Supplementary Table 1
for more details). A ﬁve alter limit was imposed to capture core
social support partners. Fewer than 20% of participants (n= 386)
used all ﬁve nominations. Ego then reported on the alter
characteristics and their connections (e.g. consanguineal or afﬁnal
kin. See Supplementary Table 1). The networks are balanced
between kin (48% of all alters) and non-kin (52%), and
geographically bounded: 53% of alters live in the same
community as ego, 49% come from the same community. These
are predominantly long-term, active relationships. Mean length of
friendship is 23 years (s.d. 13.6). 43% of ego-alter ties see each
other daily, and 66% of ego-alter ties talk on the phone daily.
A new measure of kin density. Previous research has examined
changes in the proportion of kin in ego-networks, but not the
density of kinship connections (i.e. the proportion of possible
kinship connections between alters). These are different measures
that should be distinguished. Two networks with the same pro-
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Fig. 1 Demography of the study communities. Between-community variation in a completed fertility (women aged 45+), and b proportion of endogamous
marriages (means are indicated by dashed lines); c age at out-migration for women; d frequency distribution of distances between natal and post-marital
residence for men and women, and e marriage connections between communities for women (left) and men (right). Communities in a, b are ordered from
left to right by increasing population density. Communities in (e) are shown in relative geographic space: edge width indicates the frequency of people
moving to a particular community after marriage. Data are provided in a Source Data ﬁle.
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network) can differ in kin density depending on how many afﬁnal
versus consanguineal kin ego nominates. If ego nominates her
mother (M), sister (Z) and husband’s mother (hM), kin density
will be 0.27 (M and Z are kin, but neitherM nor Z have a kinship
connection with hM). If ego nominates three consanguineal kin,
all of whom are related, this value will be 0.40 (see Fig. 2). If ego
replaces consanguineal ties with afﬁnal ties after marriage (see
Fig. 2), the kin density of her network will actually decline even
though the proportion of kin may not. This distinction is
important because there is an implicit assumption that more kin
translates directly into larger ‘kin effects’ on reproduction. As a
proxy for social interaction and information transmission, kin
density is more explicit about which kin are (or are not) con-
nected, and therefore better captures the likelihood of compound
or ‘coordinated’ interests in, and effects on, reproductive
outcomes.
Multilevel analysis of network characteristics. In three separate
multilevel models, I examine associations between household and
community level market integration and network: (M1) size: the
number of alters ego nominates; (M2) density: the proportion of
all possible ties between alters in the network that are present, and
(M3) kin density: the proportion of all possible ties that are
kinship connections (Fig. 2). Ego-alter connections are excluded
from the density measure as every alter is necessarily connected
to ego. A network with two alters has a density of 0 (uncon-
nected) if alters do not know each other and a density of 1
(closed) if they are connected independently of ego. Ego’s kinship
connections to alters are counted for kin density because ego is
not necessarily related to every alter.
Descriptive statistics for size, density and kin density. Figure 3a
shows that mean ego-network size is 2.92 (s.d. 1.46). It is 3.10
(s.d. 1.30) when excluding the 118 respondents who did not
nominate any friends. These values are consistent with networks
among subsistence horticulturalists45 and in the USA60. Mean
density is very high at 0.80 (s.d. 0.32, i= 1637), i.e. 80% of pos-
sible ties between alters are present on average. Mean kin density
is much lower overall, at 0.38 (s.d. 0.35, n= 1854), i.e. 38% of
possible ties (including those between ego and alters) are kinship
ties. Density and kin density are moderately positively correlated
(Pearson’s r= 0.14, 95% CI [0.10, 0.19]). There is a small negative
correlation between density and network size (Pearson’s r=
−0.09, 95% CI [−0.14, −0.04]), but no correlation between kin
density and network size (Pearson’s r=−0.02, 95% CI [−0.07,
0.02]). In other words, bigger ego-networks tend to be a little less
dense, but they do not tend to be less kin-dense.
Mean ego-network size in a community does not tend to co-
vary with community market integration (Fig. 3a). However
density, and more strongly, kin density, tends to be lower in
communities with higher market integration (Fig. 3b).
Kin ties loosen but networks do not shrink. As shown in Fig. 3c,
the multilevel models reinforce this broad pattern: that women
living in more market-integrated communities are expected to
have lower density and kin density, but not smaller network size
(Supplementary Table 2). Independent of other variables, a 1 s.d.
increase in community market integration is associated with 15%
lower odds of there being connections between alters in the
network (β=−0.16, s.e.= 0.07, OR= 0.85, 95% CI [0.74, 0.98])
and 13% lower odds of there being kinship connections between
them (β=−0.14, s.e.= 0.05, OR= 0.87, 95% CI [0.79, 0.95],
Fig. 3c and Supplementary Table 2).
For kin density, but not density, the association with market
integration is also apparent at the household level: a one-unit
(~1 s.d.) increase in household market integration is associated
with 11% lower odds of kinship connections being present
between alters in the network (β=−0.11, se= 0.02, OR= 0.89,
95% CI [0.85, 0.94], Fig. 3c and Supplementary Table 2). So both
household and community level market integration are associated
with reduced kin density, with the effect size being larger at the
community level. This means that irrespective of how market-
integrated a woman’s own household is, when others in her
community are highly market-integrated, her network is
substantially less kin-dense than would otherwise be expected.
Individual characteristics matter more for density. Three
individual level characteristics are importantly associated with
density: whether or not the respondent was married, a farmer, or
a migrant. For kin density, only marital status is associated. None
of these variables are strongly associated with network size (see
Fig. 3c and Supplementary Table 2). Married women have 63%
higher odds of their alters being connected than unconnected,
compared to unmarried women (β= 0.49, s.e.= 0.10, OR= 1.63,
95% CI [1.34 1.99]) and they have 2.3 times the odds of alters
having kinship connections (β= 0.84, s.e.= 0.08, OR= 2.32, 95%
CI [2.00, 2.69]). Women who are farmers have 20% higher odds
that alters in their networks are connected compared to non-
farmers (β= 0.18, s.e.= 0.07, OR= 1.20, 95% CI [1.04, 1.38], see
Fig. 3c and Supplementary Table 2), but the odds of kinship
connections between alters are no different (β= 0.05, s.e.= 0.05,















Fig. 2 Differences between network density, kin density and the
proportion of kin. a shows a sparse ego-network (d= 0, i.e. no ties
present) and b a fully dense one (d= 1, i.e. all possible ties present). Ego’s
connections to the alters are not counted (dashed lines). c shows a
moderately kin-connected network (d= 0.4, i.e. 40% of all possible ties are
kinship ties), where the proportion of kin is 0.6. Ego’s kinship connections
to the alters are counted. d shows kinship density for the same network
when afﬁnal kin (hM= husbands mother) are distinguished from
consanguineal kin, reducing the number of kin ties (M=mother; Z= sister;
d= 0.27, i.e. only 27% of ties are kinship ties). Counting the proportion of
kin in the network is not equivalent to counting the density of kin
connections.
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Table 2). And migrant women have 33% lower odds that their
alters are connected compared to women staying in their home
communities (β=−0.41, s.e.= 0.06, OR= 0.67, 95% CI [0.59,
0.75]), but again the odds of kinship connections are no different
(β= 0.02, s.e.= 0.04, OR= 1.02, 95% CI [0.94, 1.11], see Fig. 3c
and Supplementary Table 2). So married women, farmers and
‘stayers’ are expected to have more dense ego networks, but only
married women are expected to have more kin-dense networks.
Socio-economic status was associated with reduced kin density,
with a one-unit (~1 s.d.) increase associated with 10% lower odds
of there being kinship connections between alters (β=−0.11,
s.e.= 0.03, OR= 0.90, 95% CI [0.84, 0.96], Fig. 3c and
Supplementary Table 2). This is not true for density. High
socio-economic status women also tended to nominate slightly
more friends, as did materially wealthy women (β= 0.12, s.e.=
0.05 and β= 0.12, s.e.= 0.04 respectively). Finally, for every
additional sister a woman has, the odds of her alters being
connected are 9% higher (β= 0.09, se= 0.02, OR= 1.09, 95% CI
[1.05, 1.13]), and the odds of kinship connections are about 12%
higher (β= 0.11, se= 0.01, OR= 1.12, 95% CI [1.09, 1.15]).
Subset analyses support the results for kin density. Subset
analyses indicate that various compositional features of the
communities do not drive the associations between increasing
market integration and declining kin density. Among the subsets
of married women (n= 1598), farmers (n= 1239), women who
stayed in their home communities (n= 1221) and women with
either one or no sisters (n= 976), increasing community and
household market integration are strongly associated with
reductions in kin density (see Supplementary Tables 3–6). In
every subset, the magnitude of the association between market
integration and kin density is comparable to or larger at the
community than at the household level. Among married women
there is a community level association between increasing market
integration and declining density, but there are otherwise no
strong or consistent associations between market integration and
density in any of the subsets.
Other community-level predictors do not alter the results. It is
not possible to distinguish community-level market integration
from population density in these data, since they are strongly
correlated (Pearson’s r= 0.60, 95% CI [0.57, 0.62]). Replacing
market integration with population density in the models yields
qualitatively similar results (see Supplementary Table 7), with the
disadvantage that we lose the explicit multilevel comparison: we
cannot meaningfully compare a unit increase in population
density with a unit increase in household market integration.
However other community level variables can possibly be ruled
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Fig. 3 Community level variation in network characteristics. Panels show a network size and b density/kin density, ordered by average market integration
(see Source Data ﬁle). c shows forest plots of the model-adjusted coefﬁcients (ß estimates) and standard errors from the three multilevel models (see
Supplementary Table 2).
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out as primary drivers of these results. Although community-level
fertility and migration rates might make more/fewer kin available
as network partners, including average completed fertility or
proportion of migrants in the models does not alter the results
(see Supplementary Tables 8 and 9). Ultimately, a larger sample
of communities may be needed, as well as formal models, to tease
apart these factors. It is important to note that these data are
cross-sectional and the analyses correlational, so causality cannot
be established. Nonetheless, the counterfactual—that declining
kin density itself causes increased market integration—seems a
less plausible account of the relationships in these communities.
Discussion
The data and analyses presented here ﬁll an important empirical
gap in our understanding of how social networks change in the
course of market integration. They provide: a new measure, kin
density, distinguished from density and the proportion of kin;
comparison of network characteristics across multiple commu-
nities of the same ethno-linguistic and religious group, and
explicit comparisons of market integration using the same units
at different levels of analysis. Across 22 farming communities in
rural Poland—representing a mid-transition context—personal
networks are somewhat less dense, but much more clearly, less
kin-dense in more market-integrated communities and house-
holds. This apparent ‘loosening’ of kin connections is occurring
despite the fact that ego-network size does not decline with
market integration, and is independent of a range of individual-
level characteristics. This corroborates a widespread assumption
about how social interactions change as populations ‘moder-
nise’41 but which has not, to my knowledge, been explicitly
demonstrated before. The results suggest that kin density may
decline more strongly than density, or perhaps prior to it, in the
later stages of market integration.
Consistent with other evidence, married women have higher
kin density, so they are either building new kinship connections
or are simply more reliant on kin following marriage. There is a
strong emphasis on afﬁnal kin (particularly the husband’s
mother) in theorising about how kin inﬂuence women’s ferti-
lity71, child mortality40 and contraceptive uptake47,52. Carefully
distinguishing kin density from the proportion of kin allows
relationships between different family members to be accurately
accounted for, and avoids overestimating kin effects by recog-
nising that afﬁnes are often unrelated to the other kin nominated
by ego. This matters because of an implicit assumption that kin
have compound effects on reproduction: the more kin in the
network, the stronger the kin inﬂuence. Future work should
expand kin density to incorporate weighted kinship ties, which
could further delineate a variety of relations among kin.
When living in market integrated communities, married
women, farmers, women staying at home and women with few or
no sisters had ‘looser’ kinship connections than their individual
characteristics would suggest. This speaks to the broader inﬂu-
ence of higher-level socio-cultural features bearing on their social
interactions. Certain compositional features of the study com-
munities—the proportion of migrants, the local fertility levels—
do not seem to be the main drivers. We can appeal to mechan-
isms at the macro-level, but it remains unclear how to connect
these to the micro-level features described here. Broad changes in
social transmission, brought about by market integration via mass
media, new workplaces, schooling, and the increased mobility
associated with accessing these3, may accelerate both the speed at
which friendships become less kin-oriented and the level of
exposure to new ideas outside the kin-group. Macro-level
fertility decline in principle reduces the number of available kin
in the broader population72,73, but local fertility levels were
unimportant here. Rates of in- or out-migration due to marriage,
employment or educational opportunities may subtly alter
availabilities of kin, though again, having more migrants in the
community does not seem to play an important role at the level of
aggregation studied here.
The above ideas all assume that kin are ‘lost’ in similar ways in
different contexts. But declining kin prominence depends on the
context-speciﬁc support they can provide7,74, and their ability to
adapt support strategies to changing circumstances. In urban
China61 kin were nominated less over time because ego’s needs
were better fulﬁlled by social contacts outside both the family and
the workplace. Under state socialism, co-workers with job
security could secure basic economic and social resources that kin
could not offer, crowding them out. This implies a facultative
restructuring of personal friendships to meet the demands of
economic change. An analogous restructuring may be emerging
in the post-socialist context of the Polish study communities.
Following centuries of peasant farming75, the area was not col-
lectivised under socialism (1945–1989), and traditional lifeways
remained intact during the dramatic and destabilising formal
transition to market economy (1989–1991). Since accession to the
EU (2004) the government has enacted reforms to ‘modernise’
peasant farming, incentivising smallholders to give up76. Until
very recently, the combination of low mobility, high fertility,
short migration distances, male-biased inheritance practices68,
cooperative farm work and childcare generated dense marriage
networks and a shared connection to the land. Now, decreasing
fertility69 and shifting inheritance strategies that distribute par-
ental investments between children’s education and farming—
and which directly inﬂuence migration patterns68—are trans-
forming the social environment towards a less land- and kin-
oriented form.
Why should market integration be associated with this effect?
First, market economies allow for clearer separations between the
domains of family and work than in subsistence economies, and
that may let kin relations fray. Second, emotional support and
companionship may be more explicitly valued under market
economies than material and physical help, further emphasising
the demand for self-similar (homophilous) network partners over
kin. Third, material support is more likely on the scale of larger,
less-frequent transfers in market-dependent economies than the
small and frequent transfers typical in less market-dependent
ones, and this may also decrease the frequency of kin interactions.
Fourth, fungible assets (such as money) that can be immediately
exchanged, saved for future expenditures, and used to pay off
debts instead of providing in-kind services or other goods may
also allow a greater distance between kin while loosening obli-
gations to collective activities. Of course, the process may not be
smooth. Among Pimbwe communities in rural Tanzania,
inequality in market integration alongside perceived declines in
self-sufﬁciency74 generated fragmented and even antagonistic
kin relations. On the other hand, among Tsimane horticulturalists
in Bolivia, wealthier, more educated individuals living in market-
integrated communities shared food more and invested more of
their labour in collective activities, maintaining their traditional
food-sharing networks33. In the Polish context, advanced market
integration and education have changed what counts as wealth
and status and how they are translated into reproductive strate-
gies32. Some communities are more unequal as this process
unfolds32, but with farming still a viable livelihood, cooperative
activities remain important and this work is still preferentially
carried out with kin. There remain impediments to income
diversiﬁcation, including lack of opportunities or accumulated
human and material capital77. There is evident tension between a
desire to maintain a traditional lifestyle and the perceived beneﬁts
of the market economy. For example, 78% (n= 1455) of
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interviewees expressed a wish to live in a village rather than a
town but only 48% said they wanted their family to continue
farming in the future70.
Despite decades of research on fertility decline, the social
dynamics of reproduction are still poorly understood. We do not
yet know if fertility outcomes are directly or indirectly inﬂuenced
by reduced kin contact. Declining kin interactions might be an
epiphenomenon of broader structural changes (wage-labour
makes it convenient or expedient to interact with non-kin if they
are important conduits to resources), or demographic ones (fewer
kin available due to declining fertility). Either way, fragmenting
kin networks potentially allow the percolation of values uncon-
nected to reproduction through the population41 and this
important cultural mechanism has received little attention. The
adoption of norms and values associated with low fertility, driven
by a range of social transmission biases (such as conformity), may
depend on a prior loosening of these kinship ties.
Global fertility decline already has and will continue to have
enormous impacts on demography and cultural change in the
future. Connecting social networks to local demography is crucial
for a better understanding of the mechanisms underlying this
transition. The results here should help guide and provide para-
meters for formal models that are now needed to establish causal
connections. Future work should examine whether small differ-
ences in the composition and density of ego networks scale up to:
(a) change the balance of information relevant to reproduction;
(b) alter the rates and channels by which reproductively relevant
information is transmitted and (c) feed-back to transform
reproductive preferences and rates78.
Methods
Data collection. The study was approved by the Ethics Committee of the
Department of Anthropology at UCL. The data reported in this study were col-
lected between 2009 and 2010 in rural southern Poland (sampling information can
be found in the Supplementary Note 1). All participants gave informed consent.
The section of the questionnaire used to elicit the social network data used in this
study is provided in English and Polish in the Supplementary Note 1. All social
network information was provided by ego, so the reported ties are undirected.
While it is assumed that husbands/partners and male kin are important in the
personal networks of respondents, the aim of this study was to examine how other
women inﬂuenced the respondent’s behaviour, so data were not collected on male
network partners. These networks should be seen as support networks most rele-
vant to the domain of reproduction. Supplementary Table 1 gives an overview of
their main characteristics.
Covariates in the multilevel models. Covariates in the models are: farmer status
(respondent is resident in a farming household at the time of the survey or not; n
‘farmers’= 1239, n ‘non-farmers’= 733), age of the respondent (mean= 44, s.d.
17.83, range 18–91), age squared to account for the non-linear relationship between
network characteristics and age across the lifespan, marital status (n ‘ever
married’= n 1598, n ‘never married’= 374), migrant status (n ‘migrants’= 751,
n ‘non-migrants’= 1221), number of sisters (mean= 1.85, s.d.= 1.55, range 0–8),
socio-economic status, material weath and farming wealth. The latter three cov-
ariates are weighted linear combinations of multiple variables, created using
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and then standardised to have a mean of 0
and s.d. of ~132. Socio-economic status was created using the following variables:
education level of the respondent and both of her parents, parental employment
history (i.e. whether the parents were ever engaged in wage labour or not), and
whether the main income in the respondent’s childhood was derived from farming
or wage labour. Parental employment history is a good indicator of socio-economic
status in this population, since relatively few people would have been engaged in
waged employment in previous generations. Since it is known that socio-economic
status is related to the characteristics of parents as well as those of the focal
individual, this measure constitutes a more long-term deﬁnition than education of
the respondent would on its own. Material wealth was created using the following
variables: mean household income (measured across all adults in the household in
brackets ranging from <600 Polish Zlotys [PLN] per month, to >2500 PLN per
month), ownership of a computer, an internet connection, a satellite TV, a car, as
well as the number of habitable rooms in the house. This captures both income and
assets, and covers the whole household rather than simply the parents or the
husband of the respondent. Farming wealth was created using the following
variables: the number of livestock and amount of land owned, ownership of farm
equipment, and indicators of whether the family earns any income from
farming besides subsistence. Market integration captures the extent to which the
household is dependent on wage-labour versus farming income. For every
householder, occupation (ranging from student to farmer to full-time employed),
occupational status (if employed) and a binary indicator of employment history
(ever employed) were weighted to provide a cumulative score. I took the household
mean as the measure of overall market integration. The respondent is not included
in this measure to avoid confounding co-linearity with the other measures, spe-
ciﬁcally individual education. Further details of the construction of these variables
are available in Colleran et al.32 and Colleran70.
Market integration, socio-economic status, material wealth and farming wealth
are all standardised to have mean= 0 and s.d.= 1, and then group-mean centered:
a woman’s score in the analyses is her deviation from the community mean.
Group-mean centering allows market integration to be used as a community-level
predictor without introducing confounding collinearity with the household level
variable (see32). Un-centered versions of this variable produce qualitatively
identical results (see Supplementary Table 10). Age is standardised to have mean=
0 and s.d. of 1 (equivalent to 17.84 years), centered on the grand mean: a woman’s
score is her age deviation from all other women in the sample (n= 1972). The
three binary variables included in the analysis—farmer status, marital status and
migrant status—are untransformed. Number of sisters (ranging from 0 to 8) is also
an untransformed continuous variable (see Supplementary Note 1 for further
details).
Multilevel statistical analysis. All analyses were carried out in R version 3.6 using
the ‘lme4’79 ‘arm’80 and ‘blme’81 packages. Multilevel regression models use either
linear (network size) or binomial (density, kin density) error distributions. Density
and kin density are entered as a two-column matrix of ‘successes’ (i.e. number of
possible connections present) and ‘failures’ (number of possible connections
absent). Regression estimates, transformed into odds ratios, give the odds of
connections between alters relative to the absence of connections. All models were
estimated using either restricted maximum likelihood (REML) for linear models or
maximum penalised likelihood (MPL)82 with the Laplace approximation for the
binomial models. MPL uses weakly informative priors to obtain Bayesian modal
estimates on the parameters in the model, to avoid boundary problems associated
with small variance components and a small sample of groups, including incorrect
or underestimated uncertainty in the model parameters and covariance matrices.
This ensures that the variance component estimates remain off the boundary of the
feasible parameter space (zero), but with weak enough priors so that inferences
remain consistent with the data. This method extends standard multilevel mod-
elling techniques without requiring simulation as in fully Bayesian analysis (which
obtains posterior mean estimates) and outperforms standard maximum likelihood
methods. Network plots were produced using the iGraph package.83
Twenty-three women not currently living in any of the communities were
removed from the analysis of network size, leaving n= 1972. For density, only
respondents who named at least two friends were included, leaving n= 1637.
For kin density, individuals not nominating any friends were excluded, leaving
n= 1854.
Reporting summary. Further information on research design is available in
the Nature Research Reporting Summary linked to this article.
Data availability
In order to protect the privacy of participants, the data used in this study is not publicly
deposited, however the data that support the ﬁndings are available from the author upon
request. Source data for Figs. 1, 3a, b are provided as a Source Data ﬁle. Source data for
Fig. 3c can be found in Supplementary Table 2.
Code availability
The R code that supports the ﬁndings of this study is available from the author on
request.
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